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Abstract The ubiquity of low-cost GPS-enabled mobile devices and the proliferation of on-
line social networks have enabled the collection of rich geo-social information that includes
the whereabouts of the users and their social connections. This information can be used to
provide a rich set of access control policies that ensure that resources are utilized uniquely
and securely. Existing literature focuses on providing access control systems that control the
access solely based on either the location of the users or their social connections. In this
paper, we argue that a number of real-world applications demand an access control model
that effectively captures both the geographic as well as the social dimensions of the users
in a given location. We propose, Geo-social-RBAC, a new role based access control model
that allows the inclusion of geo-social constraints as part of the access control policy. Our
model, besides capturing the locations of a user requesting access and her social connec-
tions, includes geo-social cardinality constraints that dictate how many people related by a
particular social relation need to be present in the required locations at the time of an access.
The model also allows specification of geo-social and location trace constraints that may be
used to dictate if an access needs to be granted or denied. Finally, we show that the proposed
model is quite expressive and we present a set of conflict resolution schemes to deal with
potential undesirable conflicts that may arise in a geo-social context.
1 Introduction
The ubiquity of low-cost GPS-enabled mobile devices and the proliferation of online so-
cial networks have enabled the collection of rich geo-social information that includes the
whereabouts of the users and their social connections. A number of real-world applications
demand an access control model that effectively captures both the geographic as well as the
social dimensions of the users in a given location. It is often possible to use this information
to help restrict access to a particular set of resources given the location and social context of
a user. There are many such scenarios where including location and social relations into ac-
cess control models may benefit both users and their organizations. For instance, consider a
hospital where a doctor can access a patient’s record if and only if the doctor is the patient’s
primary physician and the patient is located in the waiting room outside the doctor’s office
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2or when both the patient and the doctor are in the same room. Similarly, we may want to
protect the privacy of patients by ensuring that in case a third person enters a room that is
not part of the medical personnel and is not the patient’s spouse, the health record should be
automatically closed to avoid leaking patient’s information. Another example of geo-social
access controls is restricting confidential information when a stranger enters the same room
or automatically opening an office door for a user when some trusted employees located
inside the office share a friendship relation with the user.
In addition to geo-locations, location traces also offer interesting potential in the context
of geo-social access control. In these cases, the whereabouts of a user and the people she
has recently met and the locations she has recently visited would influence how trusted the
person is and the access control decision itself. For instance, a trace-based geo-social access
control policy may ensure that if a doctor was in a contagious unit, he cannot enter the new
born unit unless he goes to a sanitizing facility first. Another example of using geo-social
traces to make access decisions will be determining if a user has recently been in company
of an untrusted person. This would result in increased suspicion of the user which may
indeed require restricting critical privileges to the user. It is also possible in some cases to
bootstrap the trust of a user to access a resource based on the people that accompany him
and the places where they have been together in the recent past. For instance, in a fast-food
restaurant, a user who has just bought something should be allowed to access other areas of
the restaurant such as restrooms and in addition, if she also has her kids with her, then she
should be allowed to use the kids’ play area.
While there are many potential benefits of a geo-social access control model, unfortu-
nately current literature does not provide a solution that allows the specification of such
policies which include both geo-social as well as location traces with geo-social cardinality
constraints. Most of the existing models support the specification of policies that depend
on user location or other contextual factors such as time, type of device used to access the
system and the type of connection used to access resources [3,5,16,6,11]. Given that many
organizations use role based access control systems (RBAC) [7] to control their resources
[12], several existing work have extended this model to include the location context [3,5,
16,11].
In this paper, we propose a fine-grained geo-social access control model, Geo-social-
RBAC, that allows the inclusion of geo-social constraints as part of the access control policy.
Concretely, in this paper we make the following contributions:
1. To the best of our knowledge, the proposed Geo-social-RBAC model is the first role
based access control model that allows the inclusion of geo-social constraints as part of
the access control policy.
2. Our model, besides capturing the locations of a user requesting access and her social
connections, supports geo-social cardinality constraints that dictate how many people
related by a particular social relation need to be present in the required locations at the
time of an access. The model also allows specification of fine-grained geo-social and
location trace constraints that may be used to dictate if an access needs to be granted or
denied based on the historical whereabouts of users.
3. Finally, we show that the proposed model is quite expressive and propose a conflict
resolution approach to deal with undesirable conflicts that may arise in a geo-social
context.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the re-
quirements of the system and present an overview of the proposed system. In Section 3, we
present the components that we use as part of the system to model the location and social
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relations and then introduce the proposed Geo-Social RBAC. In Section 4, we discus possi-
ble policy conflicts, and present the proposed conflict resolution approach. In Section 5, we
present the related work and we conclude our paper in Section 6.
2 Motivation and Requirements
In this section we motivate the need for the proposed Geo-social RBAC model and present
the requirements that guide the design of our geo-social access control framework.
We begin by discussing the types of policies that are unique to the proposed access con-
trol model that are not supported by existing systems. As discussed earlier, current access
control models do not have the capabilities to support policies that contain geo-social traces
and constraints. In this work, we focus on a RBAC [7] based geo-social model as RBAC
has become a defacto standard for organizations as it allows the specification of both dis-
cretionary and mandatory access control policies and minimizes the administrative effort
required to manage access control policies [12]. In RBAC, users are assigned to roles and
permissions are assigned to roles. In order to acquire the permissions associated with a role,
a user needs to be previously assigned to it and needs to activate it in a session. Conven-
tionally, RBAC does not support location constraints and as a result, several extensions have
been proposed to include location constraint [3,5,16,11].
We broadly classify the existing RBAC literature into two categories namely RBAC
extensions that support location based decisions [3,5,16,11] such as Geo-RBAC [3] and
LoT-RBAC [5] and models that extend RBAC with proximity constraints that include other
user’s proximity as part of the access control policies such as Prox-RBAC [10] and its ex-
tensions [9].
We present a comparison of the access control models in Table 1 based on the following
types of policy constraints:
1. Pure location constraints: these constraints only take the location of the user into ac-
count. For example, to access a confidential file, an engineer may need to be in a specific
office room.
2. Geo-social constraints: these constraints consider both the location and the social di-
mensions of the users in the policies. We further classify this type of constraints as
follows. (i) Geo-social graph-based constraint: these constraints are based on the social
graph structure. For instance, to enter into a room a person needs to be in company of at
least two friends that work there and are present. (ii) Geo-social tag-based constraint:
these constraints capture the type of relationships between the users in the social graphs
in addition to the location and social constraints. For example, a child can only access a
pay-to-view movie if he is in presence of his parent or a nanny. Tag-based policy cap-
tures both the knowledge of the social graph and information related to the type of social
connection, e.g., nanny.
3. Trace-based constraints: These constraints are based on user’s trajectory and whether
the user has been in contact with a particular set of individuals. We distinguish between
two types of constraints. (i) Location trace-based constraints: these constraints capture
the past location traces of a user as part of the access control policies. For instance, con-
sider a silicon chip manufacture company where even a minimum amount of dust may
ruin an entire production batch. If an operator has been in known dusty rooms of the
factory, he cannot enter the sterile chip production room unless he has previously passed









Pure location constraints Yes Yes Yes
Geo-social graph-based constraints No Yes Yes
Geo-social tag-based constraints No No Yes
Location-trace-based constraints No No Yes
Geo-social-trace-based constraints No No Yes
Table 1 Comparison of types of policies supported by RBAC based systems.
the user determine whether he would be able to obtain the requested access. (ii) Geo-so-
cial trace-based constraints: these constraints capture both the location history as well
as the social dimensions of the users. For example, in a company, if a visitor has entered
into the rooms used for induction of new employees accompanied by an administrator,
he can also access the welcome package files and the internal directory web pages. In
this constraint the location traces of a person are used to determine if an access should
be granted. Another scenario where this type of constraint is relevant is in an airport
where the whereabouts and the types of people airport personnel visits may influence
how trusted they are to access certain resources.
As shown in Table 1, we find that existing models do not support many constraints
supported by the proposed Geo-Social-RBAC. With this in mind, we present the following
requirements that the geo-social RBAC model addresses. First, the proposed access control
framework should allow backward compatibility with RBAC based systems and should ef-
fectively support pure location, geo-social and trace-based constraints. The model should
allow policies for different spatial granularity, for example, it should be also possible to
specify if someone needs to be in a point in the space, at a door, on a room or in a floor of a
building, in a city, among others.
2.1 Overview of the Proposed Geo-social RBAC Framework
In Geo-social-RBAC, the context of users is defined by the following information: the posi-
tion of the user and his previous whereabouts, the proximity of the user to other users and the
user’s social relations with these individuals. The system consists of users, geo-social roles,
permissions and trace-based and geo-social-cardinality constraints. In our model, users are
assigned to geo-social roles and geo-social roles are assigned permissions. To acquire per-
missions of a geo-social role, users need to be assigned to it and activate it in a session.
Geo-social roles can only be activated by a user when his contextual constraints allow it.
Hence, a user can only activate a geo-social role when the current location, his previous
whereabouts, his proximity to other users and their social relations satisfy the associated
activation constraints.
Our framework is depicted in Figure 1. The framework consists of a Location Service,
one or more Social Network Services and a Geo-Social Access Control Module. The Loca-
tion Service is trusted to provide the location of the users in the system while the Social
Network Service is in charge of maintaining and providing the social relations of the users
and other information related to the social graph. The Geo-Social Access Control Module
is responsible for performing access control decisions and consists of the a Policy Enforce-
ment Point (PEP), a Policy Decision Point (PDP), a Policy Information Point (PIP) and a
Trace Manager.
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Fig. 1 Framework overview
When a user issues a request to access a resource, the PEP intercepts the request and
passes it to the PDP which then makes the decision to grant or deny access to the system
based on the policy stored in the PIP and the contextual information of the user. The latter
is obtained from the Location and Social Network Services. Based on this information, the
Trace Manager evaluates geo-social and location traces constraints.
3 Geo-Social-RBAC
In this section we present the details of the proposed Geo-Social-RBAC. A summary of the
notations used in our model is presented in Table 3.
3.1 Social Relations
Without loss of generality, we consider a single social graph that captures the various social
relationships among the users. Here, we note that we could also use multiple social graphs
services to obtain relevant social information.
Definition 1 Let G = 〈V,E〉 be a directed and asymmetric Social Graph, where V is a set
of vertices and E a set of edges that represent users and their relationships, respectively.
We also assume that there is a set of tags W used to annotate social relations. For each
e(i,j) ∈ E there is a set that contains one or more tags W(i,j) ⊆ W that denote the type of
relation between users i and j. Tags in W are ordered according to a lattice LW .
A tag represents a specific type of social relation between two users such as a manager-
employee relationship, child-nanny relationship, teacher-student relationship and so on. This
asymmetry between relations is necessary to ensure that some policies of interest can be
specified. For example, suppose W(i,j) = {nanny, school mate} which shows that user i
is the nanny and school mate of user j, while W(j,i) = {school mate}. This allows us to
later specify policies of the type “a child cannot access a web page if he is not in presence
of his parent or a nanny”. Additionally, tags in W may be organized in a lattice LW that
represents a partial order over different relations. For instance, a lattice may show that tags
teacher and parent are greater than tag student while teacher and parent do not have any
clear ordered relation, as it is the case when a child request to wash a movie.
6Function Meaning
getSocialRelation : V × V → 2W Returns the tags of a given social relation, e.g., GetSo-
cialRelation(vi ∈ V, vj ∈ V )= W(i,j).
getSocialDistance : V × V → {N ∪∞} Returns the minimum number of edges between the spec-
ified vertices, e.g., for a direct social relation returns 1,
for a friend-of-friend relation returns 2 and for two un-
connected nodes∞.
superior : V × V → {t, f} Returns true if the first vertice, vi, is superior to the sec-
ond vertice, vj given their tags W(i,j) and lattice LW .
commonNeighbors : V × V → {t, f} Given vertices vi and vj returns true if they have neihbors
in common, otherwise returns false.
kClique : 2V → {t, f} Returns true if the given vertices form a clique, otherwise
returns false.
Table 2 Functions to extract relevant information from social graph G.
We use the functions presented in Table 2 to extract relevant information from social
graph G. Policies in geo-social-RBAC include relations between a particular user and other
users in the social graph. A valid social relation predicate S is formed by the functions
previously listed and allows verification of the existence of a particular(s) social relation(s)
or to verify if a social relation has certain properties. Our convention is to denote u as the
user and x other collocated individuals, e.g., superior(u, x).
3.2 Geo location and location traces
We make use of the Open GeoSpatial consortium geometric model [1] for modeling the user
location and their location traces. In this model, elements in a space called geometries are
modelled as points, polygons and lines. For instance, a coordinate in the space is a point, a
door may be modelled as a line and a building is modelled as a polygon. Additionally, there
are several topological relations to relate different geometries in the space; these operations
are overlap, touch, cross, in, contains, equal, and disjoint and are specified in [1]. Geome-
tries of interest are given names and are called features, e.g., a polygon that represents an
office may be named office-501. The set of all features of the system is denoted as F .
Definition 2 A feature f ∈ F is defined as a tuple 〈type, name〉where type ∈ {point, line,
polygon} represents the geometry type and name represent the name of feature f , respec-
tively.
To model the system, it is necessary to establish a reference space that we denote asM
that provides the limits of the system of interest. We assume that the Location Service en-
ables the acquisition of a user u’s location as a point in space through a function location(u)
that returns a point inM where user u is or ⊥ if the user cannot be found.
Let L be a set of functions to validate the location of users that take as input the location
of the user and identify if the location is as expected with respect to a particular place. L
contains operations such as overlap, touch, cross, in, contains, equal, and disjoint and may
also contain more refined proximity functions as the ones presented in [9]. Note that these
functions serve to measure the proximity between a coordinate an a particular location and
may be used to establish how far away a user is from others. While location(u) provides
coordinates, a function ` ∈ L verifies logical information with respect to a feature f . For
example, function ` takes the current location of user u, location(u), and a feature and
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validates if a user is standing at a particular door. Hence, a tuple 〈f, `〉 defines a spatial
scope of interest.
3.2.1 Location traces
Users generate traces as they move aroundM. We now define different types of traces that
may be collected from users.
Definition 3 A location trace ℘l(u,ts,te) of user u ∈ U during a period [ts, te] starting at
ts and ending at te is defined as a list 〈〈p1, ts〉, ..., 〈pi, tj〉, ...〈pn, te〉〉 where each item of
the list 〈pi, tj〉 contains location point pi where user u was at time instance tj . If at time
instance tj the system has no record of the whereabouts of user u, pi =⊥.
Definition 4 A geo-social trace ℘g(u,ts,te) of user u ∈ U during a period [ts, te] starting
at ts and ending at te is a list 〈〈p1, U ′1, ts〉, ..., 〈pi, U ′i , tj〉, ...〈pn, U ′n, te〉〉 where each item
of the list 〈pi, U ′i , tj〉 contains location point pj where user u was at time instance tj and
U ′i ⊆ U is the set of users that were in proximity as per function ` ∈ L of user u. If at time
instance tj the system has no record of the whereabouts of user u, pi =⊥.
Types of Trace-Based Policies:
We identified two types of trace based policies: a priori obligation trace in which a user
needs to visit a list of places in order to obtain access and triggered based policies in which
visiting a location generates a requirement of visiting other locations. An example of a priori
obligation trace policy is requiring a patient to visit the x-rays room before the first consul-
tation with an orthopaedic physician. An example of a triggered based policy is requiring
a doctor who has entered into the Contagious Unit to go to the Sanitizing Facility to gain
access into the delivery room. Here, the time when a user has visited a place is also relevant;
in the example of the doctor entering a delivery unit, we may only care about his where-
abouts in the last 24 hours. We use ᵀ to denote such period of time, which can be expressed
in multiple units such as a week, a day, a number of hours.
Definition 5 A location trace clause is a tuple 〈α,ᵀ〉, where ᵀ is a period of time and α is
produced by the following grammar1 where c represents a tuple of type 〈f ∈ F , ` ∈ L〉:
C ::= C ∧ C | C ∨ C | c
Definition 6 Similarly, a geo-social trace clause is a tuple 〈β,ᵀ〉, where β is produced by
the following grammar where g represents a tuple of type 〈f ∈ F , ` ∈ L, s ∈ S〉:
G ::= G ∧G | G ∨G | g
By using the previous definition, it is possible to require users to have come through
some places; for instance, requiring a patient to visit the x-rays room or the MRI room
before the first consultation with an orthopaedic physician. It is also possible to express this
policy in a conjunctive form, to ensure that users go to both places. Similarly, the geo-social
trace clause permits the specification of policies where the whereabouts as well as the type of
people that the user meets are relevant for making access control decisions. Hence, predicate
s is added to indicate the type of social relation.
A location clause 〈α,ᵀ〉 is fulfilled by user u if his location trace ℘l(u,ts,te), where
ᵀ = [ts, te], contains locations that satisfy α. Similarly, a geo-social location clause 〈β,ᵀ〉
is fulfilled if ℘g(u,ts,te) satisfy β.
1 For simplicity grammars omit the parenthesis to avoid distracting readers from the main issues.
8Definition 7 A trigger location trace clause is defined as trigger(〈f, `〉, α,ᵀ) where α =⊥
or is produced by the grammar presented in Definition 5 and ᵀ is a period of time. Once a
user visits 〈f, `〉, he needs to subsequently visit the places specified by α in the recent period
ᵀ. In case α =⊥, regardless what places he visits, he cannot fulfil this clause unless the
constraint times out.
Definition 8 A trigger geo-social trace clause is defined as trigger(〈f, `〉, β,ᵀ) where β
is produced by the grammar in Definition 6 or is equal to ⊥. Once a user visits 〈f, `〉, he
needs to subsequently visit places and people specified by β in the recent period ᵀ. In case
β =⊥, regardless of what places and people he visits, he cannot fulfil this clause unless the
constraint times out.
Using trigger constraints we can specify policies of the type if a user enters place x
in the recent past, he cannot access object y by using ⊥. In the following, we consolidate
obligation-based and trigger-based clauses into a single constraint we call a trace constraint.
Definition 9 A trace constraint Q is produced by the following grammar where c1 is a
trigger location trace clause, c2 is a trigger geo-social trace clause, c3 is a location trace
clause and c4 is a geo-social trace clause (as per Definitions 5, 6, 7 and 8):
Q ::= Q ∧Q | Q ∨Q | T
T ::= c1 | c2 |c3 | c4| 
Function completeTrace takes as input a trace constraint Q, a user u. If the trace con-
straint is empty, it returns true. Otherwise, it evaluates each trace clause q inQ and integrates
the results.
3.3 Geo-social Cardinality Constraints
In the proposed model, geo-social cardinality constraints are key to specify whether the
locations of a user’s social relations should interfere with the access decisions.
Definition 10 A geo-social cardinality clause is defined as a tuple c = 〈f, `, n,S〉 where
f ∈ F is the feature where at least n social connections that comply with social predicate S
need to be located at according to the proximity function ` ∈ L.
Definition 11 A geo-social cardinality constraint C is produced by the following grammar,
where c is a geo-social cardinality clause:
C ::= C ∧ C | C ∨ C | Q
Q ::= c | 
We also use function peopleAt(u, C) which takes a user u and a cardinality constraint
C and evaluates if the constraint is satisfied or not. Note that it is possible to have an empty
cardinality constraint in which case peopleAt(u, C) returns true.
3.4 Geo-Social-RBAC
With the key building blocks of our model introduced in the previous subsections, we now
present the proposed geo-social aware access control model. We first introduce Core-Geo-
Social-RBAC and then extend it to include role hierarchy.
Geo-Social-RBAC: A Location-based Socially Aware Access Control Framework 9
Notation Meaning Notation Meaning
G Social graph. R Set of geo-social roles
W Set of social relation types (tags) U Set of uses
LW Lattice of social relation types W A Set of actions
S Represents a predicate of social functions O Set of objects
F Features of the system P Permissions
M Reference space C Trace constraint
L Set of location functions Q Geo-social cardinality constraint
Table 3 Notation
3.4.1 Core-Geo-Social-RBAC
Core-Geo-Social-RBAC is defined as a tuple 〈U,RGS , A,O, P 〉. The model consists of a set
of geo-social roles RGS , a set of users U , a set of actions A a set of objects O and a set of
permissions defined as P = A × O. Users are assigned to geo-social roles and geo-social
roles are assigned permissions. We use function authorized(u ∈ U) to obtain the set of
roles that u is authorized for. Figure 1(b) presents a graphical representation of our model.
Definition 12 A geo-social role r ∈ RGS is defined as a tuple 〈SC, C,Q〉 where
– SC is a set that represents the spatial-scope of a role (places where the role can be
activated). The set contains tuples of the form 〈f ∈ F , ` ∈ L〉. When SC =⊥ the role
does not have a spatial scope is specified.
– C is a geo-social cardinality constraint as per Definition 11.
– Q is a trace constraint as per Definition 9.
A geo-social role can be in one of two states enabled, or disable.
Definition 13 A geo-social role r = 〈SC, C,Q〉 ∈ R is said to be enabled for user u if all
the following conditions are fulfilled:
r ∈ authorized(u) ∧ peopleAt(u, C) ∧ completeTrace(Q, u)
∧ ∃ 〈f, `〉 ∈ SC : `(location(u), f) ∨ SC = ∅
Otherwise r is disabled.
Henceforth, we refer to geo-social roles as roles. In the previous definition, a role r is
enabled for a user u if u is assigned to r, she is in the required location and the geo-social
cardinality and trace constraints are fulfilled. A user u can activate role r if it is enabled.
When u activates r he can obtain all its privileges. Notice that a geo-social role without any
constraint is equivalent to a standard role.
3.4.2 Geo-Social-RBAC with Role Hierarchy
Role hierarchy [13] is a feature used by some RBAC systems in which roles are organized in
a partial order. We define a Geo-Social-RBAC system as a tuple 〈U,RGS , A,O, P,RH〉 that
contains the same components as core-Geo-social RBAC but also incorporates RH which
symbolizes the geo-social role hierarchy.
Definition 14 (Geo-social Role Hierarchy) Let ri, rj ∈ RGS be two geo-social roles. ri is
said to be senior of rj , written as ri ≥ rj . If a user u assigned to ri can activate rj as long
as rj is enabled.
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Pure location constraint policy: A researcher should be in the laboratory (fourth floor) in order to access
any general files. Let r1 be a researcher’s geo-social role, with location scope SC = 〈floor4, in〉.
Geo-social cardinality constraint(for your eyes only): A senior-researcher can access a confidential vac-
cine compound formula only if he is in the confidential room by himself. Let r2 be a senior-researcher’s
geo-social role, with location scopeSC = 〈ConfidentialRoom, in〉 and a geo-social cardinality constraint
C = 〈ConfidentialRoom, in, 0, 〉.
Geo-social cardinality constraint (tag): An assistant in the research lab can only see files with pri-
vate medical information of subjects if he is in the 4th floor and there are three researchers or senior-
researchers (superiors) in the general research unit. Let r3 be a senior-researcher’s geo-social role, with
location scope SC = 〈floor4, in〉, an a geo-social cardinality constraint C = 〈GeneralResearchRoom,
in, 3, superior(u,x)〉.
Location-based trace constraint (trigger): A doctor who was in a contagious unit in the last 24 hours,
cannot enter the new born unit unless he goes to a sanitizing facility first. Let r4 be a geo-social role with
Q = 〈trigger(〈ContagiousUnit,in〉,SanitizingFacility,24hours)〉.
Trace constraint (obligation): A nurse needs to go to check all patients in their rooms in the last 2 hours
before she can sign her electronically the round-sheet. Here, role nurse r5 is associated with Q = (〈
room1,in〉 ∧ 〈room2,in〉 ∧ ... ∧ 〈 roomn,in〉,2hours) and with permission sign electronically the round-
sheet.
Table 4 Examples of policies that can be expressed in Geo-Social-RBAC.
Note that a user activating ri does not automatically inherit the permissions of its junior
roles. Instead, a user that needs to acquire the permissions of a junior role would need to
activate it in a session. This design decision was made to reduce the risk exposure, enforce
least privilege and prevent and resolve policy conflicts. A comprehensive discussion that
supports this decision is presented in Section 4.
We conclude this section by presenting some examples based on a hospital scenario that
has an Emergency Room Unit (E.R.) in the first floor, a Contagious Unit in the second, a
New Born Unit in the third floor and a Research Laboratory in the fourth. Based on this
scenario in Table 4, we present several examples that demonstrate how our model can be
used to express different types of policies.
4 Discussion on Model Expressiveness
In this section, we analyse some key aspects of our model which include its expressiveness,
resolution of conflict and discussion on our design.
4.1 Trace Constraints Verification and Enforceability
Trace constraints integrate the allowed or disallowed places that a person may visit alone
and who he may meet at certain spots. There are several challenging aspects of this type of
policy, mainly related to appropriate clause construction and policy enforcement.
Trace clause construction: We present some properties that allows the detection of inad-
vertently introduced mistakes in trace clauses and reduce unnecessary verifications during
runtime. Recall that all trace clauses (Definitions 5, 6, 7 and 8) contain α and β which define
a boolean tree, where ci = 〈fi, `i〉 are nodes and the connections between nodes in the tree
are specified by ∧ and ∨. We call trail a path of nodes joined by ∨ in such a tree. Thus, all
trails are joined by ∧.
A well-formed trace clause complies with the following properties. (i) Trail minimality:
A trace clause is said to be minimal if each ci and cj in a trail do not contain each other.
This means that a trail is not composed of features that are contained (in the spatial sense)
within each other. For example, it is clear that 〈〈floor2, in〉∧ 〈ContagiousUnit, in〉〉 is not
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a minimal clause, as the second floor contains the Contagious Unit. (ii) Tree minimality: A
trace clause is said to be tree minimal if the set of nodes that form each trail are not a subset
of the nodes of any other trail in the tree. For example, if a tree is formed by trail1 and
trail2 which contain {c1, c2, c3} and {c1, c2}, the tree is not minimal.
Trace constraints enforceability: First, enforcing trace constraints requires a careful analysis
of the paths traveled by the user. For example, consider the case of a physician that enters
twice into the Contagious Unit during the specified period window ᵀ, the first time she
disinfects herself, but the second does not. Such cases require stateful policy enforcement
techniques that models the required real-world scenarios captured by the policies while be-
ing efficient with respect to performance and scalability. The Trace Manager component in
our architecture is responsible to ensure that such cases are handled carefully with minimal
overhead.
4.2 Tag Lattice Expressiveness
Next, our model incorporates the lattice LW that has a partial order of tags that annotate
relations in a social graph. Related work in the area does not allow such tag-based annotation
and relies on RBAC policy to provide information related to the roles that users hold in an
organization. We argue that this limits the expressiveness of the model considering that
(i) RBAC policies usually do not reflect the organization hierarchical structure as they are
fine-tuned to enforce least privilege principle. (ii) it is also possible for organizations to use
core-RBAC systems (that is RBAC without hierarchy) in which case policies that express
constraints like a direct supervisor should be present are not supported. By introducing LW ,
our model supports this type of policies. As the social graph may not always be annotated
with the tags that annotate employees’ relations, in our model, we achieve the same effect
by simply integrating the hierarchical structure of the organization into the access control
decision engine to correlate social relations and LW . We also note that tags in LW may
include any type of attributes that define the relation between users in the system, allowing
the definition of very expressive policies.
4.3 Design and Expressiveness of Geo-social Role Hierarchy
In this subsection, we show the reasons for which our geo-social hierarchy is designed to
solve possible conflicts that otherwise would occur in policy specifications, without losing
expressiveness.
We consider all role hierarchy semantics studied in the literature which were summa-
rized as part of hybrid hierarchy in [13]. Hybrid hierarchy consist of three types of hierar-
chies: A-hierarchy, I-hierarchy and IA-hierarchy. Consider two geo-social roles ri, rj such
that ri ≥ rj and a user u assigned to ri. In A-hierarchy when u activates ri does not ac-
quire automatically the permissions of its junior role rj , he can activate rj provided that rj
is enabled. In I-hierarchy when u activates ri gets access to the permissions of both ri and
rj , but cannot activate rj . Finally, IA-hierarchy is a combination; activating ri acquires all
permissions from both ri and rj and users assigned to ri may activate rj . In the following
discussion we only analyse I and A hierarchies, as IA is included.
In order to see possible problems that arise when using these types of hierarchical se-
mantics, we first consider the case when ri can be activated and rj cannot. For example,
ri should be activated in room-305 when there are at least three people, while rj can be
activated in room-304. In this case, it is clear that a user cannot be simultaneously in both
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room-304 and 305. In case of I-hierarchy, when the user is in room-305 he would be able
to use all the permissions from rj . In A-hierarchy, on the other hand, the user would not be
able to use these permissions as rj is not enabled. We argue that from the security perspec-
tive that if a role has been assigned a set of constraints its associated permissions should
not be available unless the role is enabled. We also argue that this type of semantic is more
intuitive for administrators who can be sure that once they have added a constraint to a role,
the constraint is always enforced.
We also consider a scenario where rk is senior of rm and both of the roles are enabled
simultaneously. This would occur if rk and rm have the same activation constraints, if they
do not have any constraint associated with them or if the constraint of rk is a sub-case of
rm. For instance, rk can only be activated when a user is in the third floor alone while rm
can be activated when the user is in room 301, which is in the third floor. In this case, when
rk is activated in I-hierarchy semantics, the permissions of rm are automatically acquired
while in the A-semantics by activating rk the user does not obtain the permissions of rn.
However, if the user needs to acquire permissions associated with rk and rq , she can still
activate both roles.
For these reasons, in Definition 14 we use the semantics of A-hierarchies. Additionally,
using A-hierarchy semantics reduces the risk exposure significantly as was shown by Bara-
caldo et. al in [2]. We now prove that our model is equally expressive to models that use
I-hierarchy.
Theorem 1 (Hierarchy Expressiveness) The Geo-social hierarchy RH in Definition 14 can
express the same policies as other hierarchy models.
Proof. Let ri, rj ∈ RGS be related through hierarchical relation ri ≥ rj and let u be a
user assigned to ri. Additionally, let Pi ⊆ P and Pj ⊆ P denote the set of permissions
that are assigned to ri and rj , respectively. Since the hierarchy in Definition 14 uses A-
semantics, it suffices to prove that for every policy that uses I-hierarchy semantics, there
is an equivalent policy in A-semantics that would allow u to acquire the same privileges.
Without loss of generality, in the following we assume that rj does not have any junior
roles. Let Pau(r ∈ R,h) denote the permissions that are acquired by user u when activating
r and using hierarchy type h, where h = I represents the activation of role r when using
I-hierarchy semantics, and h = A when using A-semantics. We prove this by cases.
– Case 1: ri and rj can be activated simultaneously. In this case Pau(ri, I) = Pi ∪
Pau(ri, I) and Pau(ri, A) = Pi. However, u can easily acquire Pau(ri, I) by activating
rj , which is enabled, hence Pau(ri, I) = Pau(ri, A), Pau(rj , A)
– Case 2: ri cannot be activated. In this case Pau(ri, A) = Pau(ri, A) = ∅.
– Case 3: ri can be activated, but rj cannot be activated. We divide this case in two sub-
cases. Sub-case 1: The administrator wants to disallow the access to rj’s permissions
when rj is indeed disabled. In this case, using A-hierarchy achieves the objective, as
Pau(ri, A) = Pi while I-hierarchy provides too many permissions. Sub-case 2: The
administrator wants to provide the permissions of rj when ri is activated. In this case,
we prove that it is possible to provide Pau(ri, I) = Pi ∪ Pau(ri, I) using uniquely A-
relations. This can be achieved by creating rk such that Pau(rk, A) = Pau(rj , I), then
u needs to activate ri and rk. It is clear that Pau(ri, A) ∪ Pau(rk, A) = Pi ∪ Pj , and
hence the claim is proved.
Thus, the proposed model is quite expressive and resolves many potential undesirable
conflicts that may arise in a geo-social context.
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5 Related Work
Several works have extended RBAC to include the context of the user as part of the access
control decision [3,5,16,6,11]. In [6] the concept of environmental roles was presented.
An environmental role can be activated when a condition takes place. For instance, a role
rMonday would be activated when it is Monday. However, this model does not capture the
particularities of geo-social constraints or location traces as part of the policies. Other liter-
ature [3,5,16,11] focuses in including location as a factor to define access control policies.
Geo-RBAC [3] is an access control model in which access decisions depend on the position
of the object and the user that is trying to access it. For this purpose, the model includes
special roles that are activated when a user is at a particular place. LoT-RBAC [5] presents
a similar model that includes temporal constraints in addition to user location. Similarly,
in [16] a graph based approach was presented to capture location-and-time based policies.
These works differ from ours in that they do not include social relations or geo-location
traces as part of their policies.
In the past, some literature [15,8] have propose to include social relations as part of the
access control model. TMAC was proposed in [15] to facilitate the establishment of policies
that require team cooperation. Users are assigned to teams according to team membership.
To get access to a team’s resources, user permissions are determined by his or her role and
the current activity of the team. Fong present ReRAC [8] where decisions are based on
the relationship between the resource owner and the access requester. In contrast to these
models, the proposed model considers both geographical and social dimensions of the users
for making access decisions. Carminati et al. [4] propose an access control system for social
computing, user-user and user-resource relationships, and based on which access control
policies are formulated. Unlike the proposed geo-social-RBAC model, these works do not
include users’ geographical context or geo-social traces into the access control model. In
[14], a new access control model is presented where access control decisions are made based
on the location of the resource owner, the resource requester and possibly other co-located
individuals. However, unlike the proposed model, this model considers that individuals own
the resources and it is not based on RBAC, making it less suitable for company settings.
Also, this model does not consider location trace constraints as captured by our Geo-Social-
RBAC model.
Due to the fairly recent popularity of OSNs, only a few works have explored the inclu-
sion of geo-social context as part of access control systems. To the best of our knowledge,
the Prox-RBAC model proposed in [10] is the first model to extend the Geo-RBAC model to
include proximity of other individuals as part of the policy in indoor environments. However,
this model does not allow the specification of geo-social constraints based on social graphs;
in Prox-RBAC valid proximity constraints are based on the type of role of other individuals
in proximity of the access requester hold. Gupta et. al [9] extended this model to provide a
proximity based model where policies related to the location, temporal and social proximity
in terms of the position between users in a social graph can be specified. Formal definitions
to determine the proximity between locations, users, attributes and time, each of which is re-
ferred to as a realm are provided. However, their work does not allow the specification of the
type of policies that were presented in this paper. More specifically, (i) the model presented
in [9] does not allow the specification of trace-based constraints that is well captured in our
geo-social-RBAC model, (ii) unlike our proposed model, the model presented in [9] does
not allow the specification of latices to determine partial orders between social relations and
(iii) finally, we note that the access control model presented in [9] does not include hybrid
realm policies. In contrast, our geo-social-RBAC approach allows the specification of both
14
hybrid realm policies as well as policies based on social tags while also permitting the use of
social graph properties to condition access. To the best of our knowledge, the geo-social-R-
BAC framework presented in this work is the first research effort dedicated to providing a
comprehensive role-based access control model that effectively captures both social as well
as spatial dimensions of the users considering both geo-cardinality as well location-trace
constraints.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we presented a new access control model that includes geo-social factors of
the users as part of the access control decision process. The proposed model allows organi-
zations to specify their policy considering the geographic and social contexts of the access
requester users as well as that of the users located near them. We have introduced the con-
cepts of location and geo-location traces, that allow the specification of policies based on
the whereabouts of users not only during the access control decision, but during a longer
period of time such as their recent past. Our model is compatible with RBAC systems and
we believe that it helps mitigate information exfiltration threats and helps better control how
users access resources. As part of future work, we are working on devising new techniques
and algorithms to efficiently enforce our policy model.
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